We show that preference-homogeneity and loss-aversion are necessary and su¢ -cient for the value function to have the power form with identical powers for gains and losses and for the probability weighting functions for gains and losses to be identical.
Introduction
It is well known that the axioms of expected utility are violated in a range of experiments and surveys. This has been well known for a long time; for instance, Luce and Rai¤a (1957) . 1 For a more recent and de…nitive treatment, see Kahneman and Tversky (2000) .
The main behavioral alternative to expected utility is prospect theory. The earliest version was given by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . A later version based on cumulative transformations of probability and, hence, the insights developed in rank dependent expected utility, 2 was provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) .
Prospect theory has proven extremely in ‡uential in explaining a range of phenomena that could not be otherwise explained within an expected utility framework. These include the disposition e¤ect, asymmetric price elasticities, elasticities of labour supply that are inconsistent with standard models of labour supply and the excess sensitivity of consumption to income; see, for example, Camerer (2000) . Further applications include the explanation of tax evasion (Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) ) and several applications to …nance (Thaler (2005) ) among others.
A critical aspect in successfully applying prospect theory, particularly in quantitative applications, is the form of the utility function for gains and losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) state, without proof, that if preference homogeneity 3 holds, then the value function of prospect theory has the power function form
with loss aversion implying that > 1. The contribution of our paper is as follows. We give a simple proof which shows that preference homogeneity is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the preferences given in (1.1). Furthermore, loss aversion implies that, not only > 1, but also = . Finally, we show that the probability weighting function for losses must be the same as that for gains. These results are in agreement with the empirical evidence (Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) ).
Section 2 gives the basic de…nitions that we need for our main theorem, which is derived in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 1 Luce and Rai¤a (1957, p35) wrote "A second di¢ culty in attempting to ascertain a utility function is the fact that reported preferences almost never satisfy the axioms. . . " 2 This mainly had to do with a transformation of cumulative rather than objective probabilities; see Quiggin (1993) for the details. 3 Preference homogeneity is formally de…ned below. It essentially implies that when all prizes in a lottery are scaled up by a factor, say k, then the certainty equivalent of the lottery is also scaled up by the same factor k. 4 Under expected utility theory, preference homogeneity gives rise to CRRA preferences.
Preliminary de…nitions
We shall use the following notation: (x; p) stands for the simple lottery that pays x 2 R with probability p 2 [0; 1] and 0 otherwise. (x; p), given by (x; p) = (x m ; x m+1 ; :::; x 1 ; x 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; p m ; p m+1 ; :::; p 1 ; p 0 ; p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) , stands for the lottery that pays x i 2 R with probability p i 2 [0; 1], where P n i= m p i = 1 and x m x m+1 :::
:: x n . If x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) then x = ( x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) and x r = (x n ; x n 1 ; :::; x 1 ). Thus ( x r ; p r ) stands for the lottery that pays x i with probability p i . If each x i 0 and, for some i, p i x i > 0, then we call (x; p) a positive lottery.
De…nition 1 : (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) The decision maker exhibits preference homogeneity if, for all lotteries, (x; p), if c is the certainty equivalent of (x; p) then, for all k 2 R + , kc is the certainty equivalent of (kx; p).
De…nition 2 : (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) v : R ! R is a value function over riskless outcomes, if v (0) = 0 (reference dependence) and v is strictly increasing (monotonicity). Furthermore, if jv ( x)j > v (x) for x > 0 then v exhibits loss aversion. De…nition 4 : (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) Let the probability weighting function for gains be w + and let the probability weighting function for losses be w . For cumulative prospect theory, the decision weights, i , are de…ned as follows:
5 It is usual to impose the further restrictions: v is continuous, v is concave for x 0 (declining sensitivity for gains) and v is convex for x < 0 (declining sensitivity for losses). However, these extra assumptions will play no part in this paper. 
= , for all positive lotteries. We call the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. 6 
Derivation of the power form for the value function
We derive our main results in this section: Preference homogeneity for simple lotteries is su¢ cient for the value function for riskless outcomes to have the power form. It then follows that preference homogeneity must hold for all lotteries. If we add loss aversion for riskless outcomes, then the power for losses ( in (1.1)) must be the same as that for gains ( in (1.1) ). Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of loss aversion ( in (1.1)) must be greater than 1. If we extend loss aversion to apply to simple lotteries as well, then the probability weighting functions for losses and gains must be identical. It then follows that loss aversion must hold for all positive lotteries. Theorem 1, below, formalizes these results. 6 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) de…ne loss aversion only for riskless outcomes. De…nition 5 is an attempt to extend this concept to positive lotteries. The following example shows it cannot be extended to lotteries with both losses and gains. Consider the value function v (x) = x, x 0; v (x) = 2x, x < 0 and the probability weighting function w (p) = w + (p) = p. For riskless outcomes and simple lotteries, = 2. However, for (x; p) = ( 2; 0; 6; 0:5; 0; 0:5), we have ( x r ; p r ) = ( 6; 0; 2; 0:5; 0; 0:5) and, hence, . Hence, w + (p) = v(c) v (1) and, hence,
Hence, c is the certainty equivalent of (1; p). Preference homogeneity for simple lotteries then implies,
, for all c 2 [0; 1] and all k 0. (3.4)
In particular, for x = 1, (3.5) gives u (1) = 1. u (x). Hence,
, for all x > 0. (3.8)
Let x 0 and y 0. If x 1, take c = x and k = y. If y 1, take c = y and k = x. In either case, (3.7) gives u (xy) = u (x) u (y). Suppose now x > 1 and y > 1. Then (3.7) and (3.8) give u (xy) =
u (xy) = u (x) u (y) for all x 0 and all y 0 (3.9)
Since v is strictly increasing, so u is also strictly increasing (from (3.5), since v (1) > 0). Hence, (3.9) has the unique solution 8 :
Putting a = v (1), (3.5) and (3.10) give:
Similarly, by now taking
, x 0, and using the probability, w for losses, we get
Without loss of generality, we can take a = 1, so that v (x) = x , for x 0, v (x) = ( x) , for x < 0, where > 0, > 0, > 0. (3.13) (b) Loss aversion then implies
x > x for all x > 0. (3.14)
For x = 1, (3.14) gives > 1 (3.15)
Also from (3.14) ln > ( ) ln x for all x > 0. (3.16)
We will now prove that = . Suppose 6 = . Then either > or > . If > , then we can make ( ) ln x as large as we like by choosing x to be su¢ ciently large. But this cannot be because, by (3.16), ( ) ln x is bounded above by ln . If > , then we can make ( ) ln x as large as we like by choosing x > 0 su¢ ciently close to 0. But this cannot be true either. Hence = .
(c) Let 0 p 1. Then V (1; p) = w + (p) v (1) and V ( 1; p) = w (p) v ( 1). By loss aversion (De…nition 5), jV ( 1; p)j = V (1; p). Hence w (p) = w + (p). Hence w (p) = w + (p).
Simple calculations, using De…nitions 1 to 5, show that the converses of the above statements hold.
